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Kevin Pelletier

David Walker, Harriet Beecher Stowe,
and the Logic of Sentimental Terror
ith few exceptions, contemporary criticism reads nineteenth-century senti
mental fiction as a literature of love.1 When Harriet Beecher Stowe famously
asserted that the moral growth o f the nation depended on each citizen’s ability to
“feel right,” she voiced a sentiment shared by many o f her contemporaries. It is no
surprise, then, that scholars have assumed Stowe’s injunction to “feel right” was a
call to feel compassion and love, for it was ostensibly through a rhetoric of Christian
love that Stowe was able to foment a passionate outcry against slavery from many
o f her Northern readers. Indeed, sentimentalism’s transformative potential is best
expressed in Stowe’s antislavery writing, and scholars continue to uphold her fiction
as the paradigmatic example of nineteenth-century abolitionist sentimentality. The
ascendancy of love as the identifiable trait of nineteenth-century sentimental writing,
moreover, marks a crucial moment in literary criticism. Modern scholars who wanted
to claim that a formidable feminist presence existed within the American Renaissance
had to separate the sentimental tradition from nineteenth-century Calvinism, which
scholars have historically equated with patriarchal power. They have thus detached
Calvinism’s severe brand o f evangelical theology, which stressed the judgment of
God, from a feminized sentimental philosophy that emphasized salvation through
motherly love.2 As a result, the prevailing scholarly view understands love to be the
revolutionary impulse behind nineteenth-century sentimental reform, and critics use
“sympathy” and “sympathetic identification” as shorthand for this process whereby
love and compassion result from an affective bond formed across lines of difference.3
Arguments that see sympathy and love as the inevitable outcome of sentimental
narration are founded on the widely shared assumption that quintessential senti
mental scenes will inevitably produce quintessential sentimental responses, so that
representations of compassion will, in turn, arouse compassion in the reader:
sympathy will invoke sympathy, love will generate even more love. Because these
views understand sympathy and love to be autotelic, however, they fail to recognize
instances when sympathetic love is not the source of itself, when some other force
is needed to guarantee its activation. Scholars have overlooked this important
dimension of sentimental writing, even though the works of many nineteenth-century
sentimentalists recognize that love may not be a natural or an automatic response,
that sometimes compassion needs to be coerced. When love could not be depended
on as a guaranteed effect, fear often served as an incentive to love, energizing love’s
power and underwriting its potential to transform readers from fallible sinners into
moral beings. And prophecies of a retributive God, in particular, were a familiar
source of fear and constituted the most efficient way to politicize terror in the
antebellum period.
Rather than continue to treat sentimental calls for love and threats o f divine
retribution as fundamentally separate and even oppositional impulses, I explore in
this article the dramatic convergence of emergent sentimental practices with the
fire-and-brimstone rhetoric o f evangelical Christianity within nineteenth-century
antislavery writing. I consider how pleas for love and warnings o f God’s wrath
often appear in tandem, with the latter serving as a goad for the former, and I term
this dynamic “apocalyptic sentimentalism” precisely as a way to underscore the
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fundamental interrelation between the seemingly antithetical notions o f love and
vengeance, sympathy and retribution. Terror, as I will argue, is foundational to the
logic o f antislavery sentimentality and must be read in concert with and as an incite
ment to love. Antislavery writers, for example, who demanded that white Americans
sympathize with slaves, understood that simply pleading for sympathy or representing
scenes o f suffering slaves did not ensure a sympathetic response from readers.
To facilitate a compassionate identification with Negro slaves, many abolitionist
writers used threats of God’s apocalyptic retribution to stimulate a loving response
in readers, and this interaction, where calls for love are supported by warnings of
divine vengeance, will come to form a common rhetorical technique within aboli
tionist sentimentality.
Despite the prevalence of apocalyptic sentimentalism within the highly charged
reform setting o f Northern abolition, critics rarely regard this deployment of politi
cized fear to be a sentimental gesture. They see, in other words, love and vengeance
to be inherently and irreconcilably antagonistic. Gregg Camfield, for example,
insists that the Scottish Common Sense tradition, which stressed “moral sense” and
sympathy as primary ways o f establishing intersubjective relations, constituted the
epistemological source of nineteenth-century American sentimentalism. Because
the Scottish Enlightenment developed, at least in part, in opposition to Calvinist
doctrine, something like apocalyptic fear could not be seen as part of the grammar
of sentimental narration. Camfield’s view is one that critics presumably share, given
that none has described fear as sentimental affect.4 What Camfield’s argument misses,
however, are the ways in which nineteenth-century sentimentality is profoundly
energized by the evangelical fervor of the Second Great Awakening. Despite
challenges to Calvinist theology that occurred throughout the early part of the
nineteenth century by more moderate denominations like the Methodists and
Baptists,3 representations of apocalypse— often constructed through fire-andbrimstone rhetoric and warnings of retribution and judgment—nevertheless remained
and proliferated across denominational lines. This was especially true within abolition,
where the apocalypse was deployed as a political category (and not merely a theo
logical one) that antislavery radicals used to inspire a properly Christian response
from their audiences: sympathize with and learn to love America’s slaves or suffer
the wrath o f God.
I explore the interplay between calls for sympathy and love with threats of
divine wrath and vengeance by way of an unlikely pairing: David Walker and Harriet
Beecher Stowe. In part one, I illustrate how Walker’s Appeal helped to establish some
of the foundational narrative structures and tropes o f antislavery sentimentalism,
thus serving as an instructive model for reading fear as a sentimental mode in the
antebellum period. Rather than keeping the sentimental in an antagonistic relation
ship to apocalyptic theology, I will demonstrate how Walker marshals the mutually
enforcing affects of love and terror, thus energizing his pleas for sympathy and
compassion with threats o f apocalyptic retribution for those who fail to renounce
slavery. Walker’s Appeal constitutes one of the earliest examples o f this dynamic,
malting him a forerunner o f apocalyptic sentimentalism. Radicalized within the
African Methodist Episcopal Church o f Charleston, South Carolina in the era of
Denmark Vesey, David Walker portends catastrophic consequences for America’s
slaveholders, even as he somewhat surprisingly adumbrates a theory o f sympathy
that might save the nation from complete ruin .6 Traditionally viewed as a love-based,
often melodramatic domestic ideology, abolitionist sentimentality had a ruthless and
vengeful streak running through it, a streak that is not ancillary or accidental but
constitutive of its very makeup.
In part two, I investigate Harriet Beecher Stowe’s second major antislavery novel,
Dred; A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp, in order to demonstrate how the most famous
sentimentalist o f the nineteenth century replicates Walker’s sentimental structure in
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her own fiction, using fear of God’s apocalyptic vengeance to inspire sympathy and
compassion in her readers. Reading Walker and Stowe together in this way, I explore
how terror is a fundamental affect within abolitionist sentimentality, a reality that
scholars have obscured by obsession with the primacy of love at the complete
exclusion of theological wrath. I also examine how sentimental discourse has roots
in a burgeoning black literary tradition as well as suggests that gendered spheres in
the nineteenth century and the modes of discourse that characterize them (fire-andbrimstone for the masculine sphere, love and sentiment for the feminine) may be
more permeable than scholars have assumed. In one final and related point, I argue
that in addition to sanitizing the sentimental by completely submerging terror,
modern critics have fundamentally mischaracterized the forms of violence that
appear in these texts. Against these critics, who read scenes of resistance in the
Appeal and Dred as examples of “revolutionary” violence, I instead contend that
Walker and Stowe are more committed to a form of terror-inducing, scripturally
sanctioned religious violence. Revolutionary violence and theological vengeance are
not necessarily the same thing, in other words, and while exploring the productive
uses of religiously motivated terror and violence is a challenging task in our post-9/II
world, we cannot avoid such an undertaking, especially when the sentimental tradition
I describe in this article is deeply invested in the possibility o f divine retribution and
the fear that this possibility engenders as a proper response to slavery. Indeed, full
engagement with sentimental terror as I propose may illuminate a useful framework
for thinking about rhetorics o f terror that mark the contemporary moment.7

Terror and Sentiment

ut why are the Americans so very fearfully terrified respecting my Book?”
(Appeal 72). This question, posed by David Walker about his Appeal to the
Coloured Citizens of the World, will no doubt strike modern readers as disingenuous,
given what we know about the effects his work had throughout the slaveholding
South. Once the Appeal began circulating, officials arrested anyone who possessed
copies of the document. Laws were enacted quarantining Northern black sailors in
order to prevent them from disseminating Walker’s polemic or any other literature
thought to agitate slaves or endanger the autonomy o f the planter class. In fact,
Southern authorities were in such a state o f agitation that prohibitions against black
literacy were reinvigorated and earnestly enforced.® As one writer in the North Star
put it, “This little book produced more commotion among slaveholders than any
volume of its size that was ever issued from an American press” (Henry Highland
Garnet qtd. in Appeal 4). Indeed, the Appeal was the most incendiary attack against
slavery in the antebellum period, and it achieved this status by constructing a
rhetoric of terror that both portended bloody insurrection and linked ideas o f slave
rebellion with prophecies of God’s apocalyptic retribution. “Perhaps,” warns Walker
in a paradigmatic example o f this linkage, “they will laugh at or make light o f this;
but I tell you Americans! that unless you speedily alter your course, you and your
Country are gone!! ! ! ! ! For God Almighty will tear up the very face of the earth!!!”
(39; original emphasis). Warnings such as this one pervade the Appeal and inflamed
the anxieties o f Southerners, many of whom would have remembered Gabriel
Prosser’s and Denmark Vesey’s thwarted but nevertheless alarming attempts at
insurrection, and wondered if similar rebellions were being organized in which
slaves would ultimately succeed in killing their masters.
Scholarly readings o f the Appeal must inevitably account for Walker’s deeply
divisive and highly inflammatory language, and critics often treat Walker’s meditations
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on theological wrath as a metonym for revolutionary black resistance. Gene Andrew
Jarrett, Robert Levine, and Jeremy Engles have all recently contended that Walker’s
theory o f slave resistance aligns with what Maggie Sale has succinctly identified as
the “trope o f revolutionary struggle” (6). Walker’s emphatic critique o f Jefferson’s
racialist views in Notes on the State of Virginia as well as his co-option of the Declaration
of Independence (the revolutionary document par excellence) only further underscores
his apparent investment in revolutionary modes of critique. In the way Walker
engages Jefferson’s ideas on freedom, ideas that form the bedrock of American
liberal selfhood, it would appear that he is deliberately locating himself within a
genealogy o f revolution that traces back to the nation’s founding.9 As Eric J.
Sundquist has argued, “African American writers such as [Frederick] Douglass,
[Martin] Delany, [David] Walker, William Wells Brown, and Harriet Jacobs” were
deeply invested in strategies for resisting enslavement and “had been quick to link
slavery [and slave resistance] to its complex revolutionary heritage” (29)}® Critics
continue to read Walker specifically, and nineteenth-century arguments supporting
slave insurrection more generally, as signs that antebellum black Americans were
revolutionaries insofar as they opposed institutions that violated rights intrinsic to
nature and guaranteed by God, confirming, in Wendell Phillips’s words, that “colored
men” like Walker are “patriotic— though denied a country:— and all show a wish,
on their part, to prove themselves men, in a land whose laws refuse to recognise
their manhood” (Nell 8). The story o f America’s revolutionary origins remains a
favorite among modern critics as a way to frame how the most subversive abolitionists
justified violence as a chief mechanism for emancipating Negro slaves.11
While most scholars have treated evangelical theology as a cooperative world
view in the service of revolution, I want to separate them in this article in order to
contextualize the terror that Walker’s blazing religious discourse engendered. Ideas
regarding the slaves’ revolutionary agency, which have been a particular obsession
among critics for at least the past forty years, tend to submerge the terror that apoca
lyptic prophecy is intended to produce. When scholars marshal the “revolutionary”
as an ideological category, they invoke a set of associations, specifically liberal rights,
democratic citizenship, and the inherent equality o f all persons. Those scholars who
avow Walker often do so by normalizing the violence he promotes, claiming that he
is a “revolutionary” in the eighteenth-century understanding of this notion. By making
violence revolutionary and not theological or merely retributive, critics unwittingly
temper Walker’s incendiary presence by placing him in a tradition in which violence
was necessary to preserve the self-evident freedoms that inhere in all persons. Anyone
who fights for these rights, including Negro slaves, is identified as a revolutionary,
so that revolutionary violence is understood to be a rational phenomenon and
indicator of the Enlightenment push towards the perfectibility of the human spirit.
Revolutionary violence, then, is not destabilizing or destructive in these views, but
normative and constructive o f a world where all persons enjoy the rights and privi
leges of citizenship. Given that most slaves were desirous of freedom and equality,
and in light o f scholarly interest in the forms of nineteenth-century slave resistance,
it makes sense that modern critics would apply a revolutionary framework to interpret
acts of violent resistance. As a result of their fixation on the revolutionary, however,
scholars have left very litde room for discussing the emotionality of those arguments
that, like Walker’s, are predicated on apocalyptic terror.
Rather than equating black violence with revolutionary resistance, I want to
return to the rhetoric of terror that is so emblematic o f Walker’s Appeal and that
made it such a dangerous document in the antebellum period. Even though it is not
typically identified as an example o f sentimental writing and often appears more
concerned with punishing slaveholders than it does with inspiring in them feelings
o f love and compassion, the Appeal stands as an influential model for the kind of
antislavery argument that depends on fear to stir affective bonds between black and
white Americans, bonds that may in turn catalyze a change in or even a dismantling
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o f the slave system. Walker’s plea is designed to establish a form o f sympathetic
connection between his white audience and the slaves that they oppress, and he relies
throughout the Appeal on what will become by midcentury a classic strategy for
sentimental writers: an address as directed toward his readers’ hearts. Walker
announces to his audience early in the Appeal that, with God’s help, he will “open
[their] hearts to understand and believe the truth” (Appeal 1) of the slave’s degradation
and the need for Southerners to relinquish their slaveholding practices. “I appeal to
every man o f feeling” (10), says Walker, suggesting that moral reform begins with
feeling right, a view that Harriet Beecher Stowe will codify twenty years later in
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Walker reasons that a man who witnesses firsthand the slave’s
burden, provided he is “not a tyrant, but has the feelings of a human being, who
can feel for a fellow creature” will surely “see enough to make his very heart bleed”
(21). The bleeding heart is a sympathetic heart, and redressing slavery begins for
Walker as it will begin for so many antislavery reformers who adopt sentimental
conventions: with appeals to emotion and calls for the reformation of feeling.
Walker believes that white and black Americans can learn to live together harmo
niously, provided a proper affective bond between them can be constituted. Indeed,
his ultimate goal in the Appeal is a racially integrated nation in which blacks enjoy
the same respect and rights as citizens that whites enjoy. “Treat us like men,” says
Walker, “and there is no danger but we will all live in peace and happiness together.
. .. Treat us like men, and we will be your friends” (Appeal 70). Given the Appeals
angry rhetoric, it would be easy to overlook Walker’s reconciliatory vision, where
racial segregation and acrimony are overcome in favor of amity between all citizens,
regardless o f skin color. Walker remains emphatic, though, in his desire for unity,
assuring readers that any misgivings they may have are unfounded, and underscoring
interraciality as a necessary national ethos as well as a real political possibility. “And
there is not a doubt in my mind,” Walker states, “but that the whole of the past will
be sunk into oblivion, and we yet, under God, will become a united and happy people.
The whites may say it is impossible, but remember that nothing is impossible with
God” (70). Notwithstanding the hardships they have suffered under slavery, black
Americans will surrender the past in order to realize a more promising future. It
could be said, then, that the aim o f the Appeal is nothing less than the creation o f a
racially heterogeneous but nevertheless unified nation state that is sanctioned by
God and federated by feeling, with each citizen affectively associated with every
other citizen.
Even as he unfolds this vision in which a compassionate white audience feels
for black slaves, and this sentimental solidarity in turn leads to national unity, Walker
faces a problem, one that antislavery reformers and sentimental writers throughout
the 1840s and ’50s would continue to face: namely, that white Americans are simply
not feeling for or sympathizing with slaves, regardless of how pitiable or deplorable
the slaves’ circumstances might be. Calling for sympathy, in other words, or repre
senting scenes that are meant to elicit a compassionate response from white readers,
is not necessarily going to achieve the desired effect. Walker explicitly engages the
failure of white Americans to sympathize with slaves and their willingness to take
the slaves’ wretchedness as a fact of nature and a reflection o f God’s will. “But the
Americans,” says Walker, “having introduced slavery among them, their hearts have
become almost seared, as with an hot iron, and God has nearly given them up to
believe a lie in preference to the tru th !!!” {Appeal 43). Instead of enabling whites to
bond with and learn to care for blacks, white hearts have been hardened by slavery
and have thus lost their capacity to facilitate feeling. Walker cannot simply appeal to
the hearts o f white readers when these hearts no longer perform their primary
function as repositories of emotion and agents of sympathetic identification. Walker
needs some corrective measure to activate white sympathy and to calibrate these
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sympathies with their proper object, and he finds this measure in the threat of
God’s vengeance, a threat that immediately follows the preceding passage:
And I am awfully afraid that pride, prejudice, avarice and blood, will, before long prove the
final ruin of this happy republic, or land of liberty! !! ! . . . Will the Lord suffer this people to
go on much longer, taking his holy name in vain? Will he not stop them, PREACHERS and
all? O Americans! O Americans! ! I call God—I call angels— I call men, to witness, that
your DESTRUCTION is at hand, and will be speedily consummated unless you REPENT.
(43; original emphasis)

Warnings like this one of God’s apocalyptic retribution can be found throughout
the Appeal, underscoring that terror and love are inseparably linked, with the former
serving as an incitement to and prerequisite for the latter. What may seem counter
intuitive to modern readers is precisely what Walker regards as self-evident: love is
not an absolute or self-sufficient emotion, but rather requires a threat to activate its
power. Walker appreciates that hearts do not necessarily sympathize independently,
but instead require some reason to feel. His own theory o f sentiments is structured
such that the threat of God’s retributive wrath, and the fear that this threat engenders,
will motivate whites to feel and perhaps even learn to care for blacks. Like later
works of sentimental narrative, Walker’s argument is predicated on a sympathetic
connection that is rooted in deeply felt emotion, but unlike scholarly claims that
understand love and sympathy to be autogenic, Walker positions fear as a necessary
inspiration for sympathetic affection. America can only achieve a multiracial union
when whites are bonded by sympathy to their black brethren, and this sympathetic
connection will only be established if it is energized by the fear o f divine vengeance.
Walker inscribes the apocalyptic as both a theological prophecy and a sentimental
register, combining established religious ideas regarding God’s judgment with
emergent sentimental ones. Indeed, fire-and-brimstone rhetoric and representations
o f retribution and judgment— familiar early nineteenth-century conceptions of
apocalypse that helped form a powerful epistemology within the evangelical culture
o f the Second Great Awakening— are designed to inspire an emotional response in
the reader, and it is on this level of affect that the sentimental and the apocalyptic
converge. Walker’s repeated use o f violent and bloody imagery is grounded in the
highly charged political and cultural climate in which his antislavery sensibilities
matured. His participation in the AME Church in Charleston, and his possible
involvement in the Denmark Vesey plot no doubt made a formative impression on
his thinking about violent rebellion. 2 Like Vesey, Walker’s notions of rebellion are
thoroughly based on Scripture and modeled on those passages from the Bible that
portray God smiting unregenerate sinners in all o f his apocalyptic fury.13 Walker
summons the apocalyptic, not merely to challenge the institution of slavery, but also
to inspire terror in his audience by invoking a wrathful divinity that has promised to
mete out punishment. The forms o f violence Walker depicts are not meant to
replace a tyrannical form o f governance with a benevolent one, as is suggested in
the Declaration o f Independence. To the extent that it is figured apocalyptically,
violence in Walker’s Appeal is widespread, bloody, and complete, with God separating
the saints from the sinners, the wheat from the chaff.
Surprisingly, these same representations of a violent Biblical apocalypse also
constitute some o f the paradigmatic sentimental expressions of the antebellum
period, and Walker’s invocations of God’s vengeance function in the Appeal as an
indispensable blueprint for sentimental persuasion .14 It is precisely because com
passion and fear are paired in this way that one often finds in the Appeal lamentations
about a lack of love in whites immediately followed by threats o f God’s wrath.
One emotional economy bolsters the other. “I hope that the Americans may hear,”
pleads Walker, “but I am afraid that they have done us so much injury, and are so
firm in the belief that our Creator made us to be an inheritance to them for ever,
260

AFRICAN AMERICAN REVIEW

that their hearts will be hardened, so that their destruction may be surd’ (Appeal 40; emphasis
added). Hardened hearts are poor conductors of sympathy, and instead o f merely
depicting scenes o f the slaves’ sorrow, as if images of a suffering slave could some
how guarantee a sympathetic response, Walker reminds his readers of the destructive
consequences that will ensue if they do not reform their sentiments. “This language,”
Walker continues, “perhaps is too harsh for the American’s delicate ears. But Oh
Americans! Americans!! I warn you in the name o f the Lord, (whether you will hear,
or forbear,) to repent and reform, or you are ruined! !!” (45). Fear resuscitates
unresponsive hearts and is targeted at those Americans who exist furthest outside
the bonds of sympathy and compassion. “For I declare to you. . .,” says Walker,
“that there are some on this continent of America, who will never be able to repent.
God will surely destroy them, to show you his disapprobation of the murders they
and you have inflicted on us” (69). Acknowledging the problem of readers who are
disinclined to feel compassion for slaves and who consequentially must be provoked
into penitence, Walker encourages an antislavery approach in which inspiring readers
to “feel right” entails first making them afraid so that they may avoid the apocalyptic
repercussions that in his Appeal seem so inevitable.
And it is precisely the inevitability of apocalypse/insurrection that makes
Walker’s Appeal such a terrifying indictment o f slavery. Given how emphatic Walker
renders his threats (the capital letters, the frequent use o f exclamation points, etc.),
there is a sense that it is almost too late, that the nation is precipitously close to the
edge, and that what Walker really desires is to give America a shove into bloodshed
and torment. It is typically at this moment that scholars retreat from the full impli
cations of the Appeal argument, claiming Walker as a revolutionary in order to allay
the anxiety that comes with full realization that he is championing an antislavery
response founded on terror and religious violence that does not accord with
American liberal ideals. Robert Levine, for instance, avoids the reading of Walker I
am offering here. Acknowledging that the Appeal ends with an enthusiastic call for
“black vengeance,” Levine nevertheless claims that Walker’s ideas of violence are
fundamentally informed by his reading of the Declaration o f Independence (107).
Levine highlights the way Walker marshals the Declaration as part of his critique of
the nation’s hypocrisy, but he nevertheless overlooks how the examples he quotes
from the Appeal show Walker referring to America’s founding document as “your
Declaration of Independence” and “your language” and “their Declaration” (107,110;
emphases added). Walker suggests, in other words, that he does not share a common
language of freedom with white Americans; nor do his ideas of liberty and resistance
originate from the same ideological source. And why should they? America already
had one revolution, and it did nothing to improve the lives o f America’s slaves.
Given the failure o f America’s revolutionary history as it bears on slavery, it stands
to reason that Walker would adopt an alternative world-view in order to theorize
new modes of resistance. In fact, as I have been arguing, Walker is much more
indebted to the emancipatory potential of radical Christianity than he is the
Declaration of Independence— a point that is concealed when apocalypse and
evolution are treated as synonyms, or when the theological is so thoroughly subsumed
by the revolutionary that it is barely distinguishable from its privileged counterpart.15
The terrifying prescience o f Walker’s words was amplified with Nat Turner’s
insurrection in 1831 and the subsequent publication of his Confessions. Turner repre
sents the incarnated threat that Walker prophesied only two years earlier. And in the
way it articulates an affiliation between apocalyptic prophecy and violent responses
to slavery, Nat Turner’s Confessions constitutes an important companion text to
Walker’s Appeal. Indeed, what makes the historical moment in which the Appeal and
Confessions appear so powerful is the combined statement on apocalyptic fear that
each makes. Turner’s Confessions also serves as a useful bridge linking David Walker
to Harriet Beecher Stowe, given that Stowe will directly engage with the historical
DAVID WALKER, HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, AND THE LOGIC OF SENTIMENTAL TERROR

261

problem o f Turner in her second major work of antislavery fiction, Dred. The theo
logical terror that operates in Walker’s Appeal and Turner’s Confessions is equally a
part of Stowe’s intellectual and aesthetic itineraries; she is always threatening God’s
judgment, always prophesying apocalyptic destruction. And Turner is a formative
and abiding presence in Stowe’s sentimental imagination, so much so that she
includes much of Turner’s confession in the first Appendix o f Dred. Unlike Turner,
however, whose “object” was to “carry terror and devastation” wherever he went,
and whose sole intent was to “strike terror to the inhabitants” (50-51), Stowe fuses
images that inspire terror with calls for compassion and love, articulating a sentimen
tality in which fear and love constitute the emotional foundation of moral reform.

Dred and the Sentimental Apocalypse

ublished only four years after Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Stowe’s second major anti
slavery novel, Dred appeared just as some of the most controversial and divisive
issues within the slavery crisis were unfolding, such as the passage of the KansasNebraska Act (1854), South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks’s beating of
abolitionist Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner on the Senate floor, and John
Brown’s raids in Kansas (both 1856), and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Dred Scott
v. Sanford (1857). In many ways, the novel attempts to explore fictionally what was
occurring within America’s cultural, political, and legal landscapes.16 For the first
seventeen chapters, the novel portrays “ordinary” life in Canema, a pleasant and
typically Southern plantation, and focuses specifically on Nina, a young, white
Southern heiress, and her romantic relationships, especially the one she entertains
with Edward Clayton. Given the novel’s title, Dred’s arrival in the eighteenth chapter
might have seemed surprisingly late to Stowe’s readers. Even as the novel paints this
portrait o f idyllic Southern life, however, those readers realize some two hundred
pages into the narrative that Dred has been there the entire time. He lurks on the
margins and in the swamp, waiting for the opportunity to exact vengeance on the
white slaveholding South. In the pages that follow, I argue that Dred, a plotting
insurrectionist who repeatedly portends apocalyptic destruction to Southern slave
holders, does not exist outside o f the sentimental or in conflict with it, but in fact
becomes precisely the engine o f the sentimental as Stowe constructs it in this narrative.
Indeed, following David Walker, Stowe uses the threat o f insurrectionary violence
as a way to motivate her readers to reform their views about slavery. In this way, she
further develops the rhetoric of apocalyptic sentimentality that Walker first outlined
in his Appeal, where warnings o f God’s (or the slave’s) retributive wrath are meant
to inspire in white readers sympathy and compassion for black slaves. As her most
audacious gesture, Stowe sentimentalizes the legacy of Nat Turner, transforming
insurrection into a foundational component of the nineteenth-century sentimental
imagination.17
Near the halfway point of the novel, Stowe gives her readers the most resounding
statement regarding the apocalyptic dimension of Dred’s sentimentality. At a large
camp-meeting near the Canema plantation, Nina Gordon and Edward Clayton listen
to one o f Father Bonnie’s impassioned sermons. “I tell you the Lord is looking now
down on you,” Father Bonnie proclaims, “out o f that moon! He is looking down in
mercy! But, I tell you, he’ll look down quite another way, one of these days! O, there’ll
be a time of wrath, by and by, if you don’t repent!” With language emblematic of
the Jeremianic tradition, Father Bonnie warns, “There’s a judgment-day for you!
O, sinner, what will become of you in that day? Never cry, Lord, Lord! Too late—
too late, man! You wouldn’t take mercy when it was offered, and now you shall have
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wrath!” (Dred 259).18 The terrifying threats contained in Father Bonnie’s sermon
inspire Nina Gordon, the novel’s heroine, to ask what is, essentially, the foundational
question regarding sentimentalism within the novel: “Can fear of fire make me
love?” (261). For Nina, the question of whether fear is a necessary dimension of
affect in the creation of a loving Christian heart is an urgent one in light of Father
Bonnie’s warning to sinners that they are running out o f time. Clayton’s response to
Nina is telling: “If we may judge our Father by his voice in nature,” Clayton says,
“he deems severity a necessary part of our training. Fire and hail, snow and vapor,
stormy wind, fulfilling his word— all these have crushing regularity in the movements,
which show that he is to be feared as well as loved” (261).
This exchange between Nina and Clayton illuminates a disjunction that has
occurred between Stowe’s time and our own. That is, what for Stowe and her
contemporaries was axiomatic remains for many modern readers a paradox that must
be explained away or ignored: namely, that the Biblical god is simultaneously loving
and vengeful, merciful and brimming with fury. Stowe harmonizes these ostensibly
competing impulses, and Dred is a novel that expands upon the sentimental structure
I described in Walker’s Appeal, where theological terror was used to bolster love
when love was either lacking or not present at all. While love is the ultimate goal of
sentimentalism, one cannot assume it will appear simply by invoking it. This reality
concerning the unreliability of love would have been especially important to someone
like Stowe, who was convinced that America was on the precipice of disaster over
its inability or reluctance to resolve the slavery issue in a way that conformed to what
she understood to be the indisputable moral tenets of Christianity.
That readers continue to overlook this structuring of the sentimental in Stowe’s
antislavery fiction can be seen in the way they privilege the authority of the character
Milly at the exclusion of Dred. Because of the way Milly proselytizes an ethic of
Christian love, readers continue to champion her as the purest expression of senti
mentality in the novel. In fact, many scholars completely evade considering Dred as
a sentimental figure by separating Dred from the sentimental dynamics of the novel,
treating him as a black revolutionary, even though virtually every word he speaks is
about the fulfillment of apocalyptic prophecy, not revolution.19 The most powerful
piece o f “evidence” readers use to discount Dred’s importance in favor of Milly’s is
the scene in which Milly interrupts a meeting between Dred and his co-conspirators,
and ultimately “dissuades” them from choosing violent insurrection as a means of
dismantling slavery. “If dere must come a day o f vengeance,” says Milly to those in
attendance, “pray not to be in it! It’s de Lord’s strange work” {Dred 461). She implores
them to reconsider, exclaiming, “O, brethren, dere’s a better way... . Leave de
vengeance to him. Vengeance is mine— I will repay, saith de Lord” (461, 462). To her
injunctions against violence, Dred replies, ‘Woman, thy prayers have prevailed for
this time! The hour is not yet come!” (462). Dred’s apparent hesitation has led
scholars like Joan Hedrick to conclude that “Dred’s Old Testament militancy is stilled
by the words of Milly” (259) and Charles Foster to argue that Milly accomplishes
the “conversion of Dred to Christian pacifism” (85). Based on the supposed
supremacy of Milly’s moral compass, John Carlos Rowe has even asserted that she
is the “fictional persona for Stowe herself” (50).
It is understandable why critics would assume that Dred and Milly occupy anti
thetical positions, and that Stowe ultimately favors the former over the latter. Against
these views, however, I would argue instead that these two characters actually work
in concert to structure the sentimental foundation o f this narrative. Dred’s wrath
and the fear that it produces is meant to incite an abiding commitment to compassion
and forgiveness exemplified by Milly, and these two affective energies are more
symbiotic than they are oppositional. Stowe favors neither Milly nor Dred, but instead
constructs these characters to exemplify the Biblical figure of Jesus, a being who is
both loving and vengeful, capable of mercy and prepared to mete out punishment.
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In other words, Stowe does not use Milly and Dred to present two dichotomous
paths, one leading to sympathy and love, the other to violence and retribution. Just
because Dred concedes to Milly that the hour has not yet come does not mean that
it will not, but only that Dred is willing to wait for a sign from God that the moment
to insurrect has arrived. Once readers understand the affective dynamic that is created
by the interaction of Dred and Milly, where the terror embodied by Dred is meant
to goad the love espoused by Milly, they will more easily recognize and appreciate
the countless examples throughout Dred where scenes foregrounding love and com
passion run adjacent to and are motivated by moments that invoke wrath and woe,
much like they did in Walker’s Appeal.
If Dred is so crucial to the sentimentality of the narrative, however, why does
Stowe kill him off before he can exact vengeance against slaveholders? Why does
he never receive the sign he was so sure God would deliver to him to initiate violent
rebellion (and that Nat Turner was so certain he did receive)? Why is it only Milly
who is able to live out her days in relative freedom in New York? The killing of Dred
may look like Stowe’s ultimate disavowal of a character who symbolized hope for
America’s slaves, but who posed a threat that in the end Stowe found to be untenable.
Perhaps it is for this reason that some readers have criticized Stowe for failing to
depict a slave revolt.20 The problem, in other words, is that Stowe is unable to follow
her own antislavery politics to their logical conclusion. She lacks the courage to depict
a rebellion in which slaveholders finally suffer for their sins. This view, however,
misses the point entirely. Stowe does not depict Dred and his co-conspirators
committing acts of violence because her solution to slavery is a sentimental one,
not one predicated on slave rebellion. By threatening insurrection throughout the
narrative, and by linking insurrection to apocalyptic prophecy, Stowe aims to inspire
fear in her readers, fear that will in turn motivate them to love Negro slaves and
reject slaveholding. This is the sentimental structure of Stowe’s political response.
If, however, she depicts Dred committing actual acts of violence— if she represents
his co-conspirators killing white people— then these slaves will become, in the eyes
o f white readers, insurgents that are undeserving o f sympathetic love. Slaves will be
seen not as worthy o f compassion (which would be the proper sentimental response),
but as a threat that needs to be eradicated, perhaps even preemptively. By representing
insurrection and not simply threatening it, Stowe would, in effect, undermine the
very sentimental response that she has been trying to construct all along. An insur
rectionary apocalypse functions best as a threat, not as an actual event. If Stowe
promotes an antislavery view that advocates slave violence, she endangers what is
for her a foremost concern: shaping a nation of readers that loves as Christ did
and thus rejects America’s most immoral practice. Unlike Walker, who would have
welcomed insurrection and in many ways wrote the Appeal in order to hasten the
end o f days, Stowe suspends the threat by removing Dred from the narrative. Walker
intimates that it may already be too late for slaveholding Americans. Stowe, however,
wants to sustain the possibility o f redemption, but in order to do so she must elimi
nate the only agent who could prematurely foreclose any possibility o f reform.
The specter of slave violence does not end with the death of Dred, however.
As a way to remind her readers o f the very real dangers o f slaveholding, Stowe
concludes the narrative by appending an excerpt of Nat Turner’s Confessions. In this
way, Stowe not only links the fictional characters in Dred with the historical actors
who participated in the Southampton revolt. She also returns to one of the most
apocalyptic figures of the antebellum period who, in turn, “produces” one o f the
most apocalyptic texts of the entire nineteenth century.21 As Stowe remarks, “ [one]
of the principal conspirators” in the Turner-led insurrection was a man named
Dred, and if readers are to understand Stowe’s fictional creation, they must first
consider one o f the historical sources on which she bases her protagonist. Dred’s
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language in many ways parallels Turner’s (and Walker’s). As Turner says, “ [On] the
12™ of May, 1828,1 heard a loud noise in the heavens, and the Spirit instantly
appeared to me and said the Serpent was loosened, and Christ had laid down the
yoke he had borne for the sins o f men, and that I should take it on and fight against
the Serpent, for the time was fast approaching when the first should be last and the
last should be first” (Dred 557). Unlike Dred, Turner receives the sign from heaven
that the bloodshed can begin, and his “object” from that moment on is “to carry
terror and devastation wherever” he goes, and “neither age nor sex was to be
spared— which was invariably adhered to” (558). Turner gets to do what Dred was
never permitted— usher in the violence. Stowe appends Turner’s Confessions precisely
to underscore the point that Americans can expect real bloodshed, and not simply
fictional warnings of it, if they fail to end slavery. Stowe cites Turner’s Confessions in
order to make a moral argument against slavery, a move that has confounded
modern readers who want to claim her as a paragon of love-based sentimentality and
who have had to exclude Dred (and ignore Turner) as a product of her sentimental
imagination in order to do so.
Even as she uses Turner to sustain the possibility of insurrectionary violence,
Stowe refuses to portray it, even though she is not responsible for Turner’s actions
the way she would be for Dred’s. As in Dred, the violence is cleansed from Turner’s
confession. In the excerpt Stowe appends, Turner proceeds to describe the details
of his violent rebellion through Southampton County, Virginia. Just as he begins to
address the acts in question, the narrative voice interposes, saying, ‘W e will not go
into the horrible details of the various massacres, but only make one or two extracts,
to show the spirit and feelings of Turner” (Dred 558). While Stowe redacts Turner’s
account for the purposes o f her narrative and excises the most violent parts, her
readers would have been acutely aware of Turner’s original statement, namely those
passages from his account that detail the lulling of the Travises, especially the infant
“sleeping in a cradle” (Turner 49). This is the outcome towards which America is
headed, with Turner acting the part of God wreaking havoc within the slaveholding
community.
While modern readers— and even some of Stowe’s contemporaries— might
justifiably point out the naivete or ineffectiveness of Stowe’s argument, it is never
theless imperative that we see Stowe’s solution to be a decidedly sentimental one in
the way it uses threats of violent reprisal to compel readers into nurturing a loving
and sympathetic disposition. Between the death o f Dred and the appearance of
Turner, fhere is a narrative space where reform can occur. That is, Dred’s passing does
not mean that Americans have nothing left to fear because while Dred represents a
fictional apocalypse, what is coming may be much worse and no longer imaginary.22
For this reason, Stowe sustains the possibility o f reform far more persistently than
Walker ever would. As much as she may believe America is headed towards a terrible
but just end, it is an end Stowe would nevertheless prefer to avoid. Her sentimental
solution to slavery is meant to stave off the impending apocalypse, whereas Walker
suggests that an apocalypse is precisely what is needed for America’s sins to be
purged. While Stowe and Walker share a common rhetorical style, where fear acts as
an incitement to love, there is a divergence in the outcomes each writer is willing to
entertain, a divergence that is no doubt informed by their racial, gender, and class
positions, and the larger literary contexts from which they write. The fact that
Walker is a free black writing in a racially segregated and economically stratified
Boston in 1829, and Stowe a middle-class white woman from a prominent family
writing in the 1850s informs the way they would have explored violence as a
response to slavery, and determines how far they would be willing to promote
bloodshed as a legitimate form o f resistance.
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his sentimental configuration, in which threats of apocalyptic destruction are
used to motivate sympathetic connections, will surface throughout the anti
slavery discourses o f the antebellum period. Writers as varied in their aesthetic and
political sensibilities as Maria Stewart, William Lloyd Garrison, Frederick Douglass,
and Martin Delany will imitate Walker’s and Stowe’s sentimental model, accompanying
calls for love with terrifying images of God’s vengeance, using fear of God’s wrath
as a sentimental support system for sympathy and compassion. And while it might
initially seem strange to regard him as a precursor to a form o f sentimentalism, it is
important to locate Walker at the beginning of the tradition I have been describing
in this article. The first sustained critique of slavery by an African American,
Walker’s Appeal preludes a trend within American sentimental culture where calls for
greater love are conjoined with and motivated by threats of apocalyptic retribution.
Sentimental culture is often thought to be a middle-class phenomenon, and literary
sentimentalism a style that blossomed among white, midcentury, bourgeois women.
Reading Walker on the threshold of this blossoming helps us frame and explain the
emotional dynamism of his argument, a topic that has been sorely neglected by
critics. Such a perspective should also help us revise our views about the racial and
class origins o f American sentimentalism so that we begin to see its emergence
rooted in white and black forms of representation. As a forerunner o f apocalyptic
sentimentalism, Walker’s Appeal expands the category of the sentimental and should
be read alongside lesser-known, but no less important African American writers
who share aspects o f Walker’s approach, such as Maria Stewart, Jarena Lee, and
Rebecca Cox Jackson, as well as the more well-known sentimentalists, like Harriet
Beecher Stowe. Indeed, by establishing this link between Walker and Stowe, and by
recognizing that a rhetorical style present in Walker’s Appeal reappears in Stowe’s
antislavery fiction, we are forced to reassess what we mean when we deploy the term
“sentimentalism,” beginning with our ideas about sentimentalism’s relationship to
evangelical theology. Rather than existing outside of or in conflict with sentimentalism,
it appears instead that prophecies of apocalypse helped to shape the very formation
of nineteenth-century abolitionist sentimentalism.
The contexts surrounding Walker’s Appeal and Stowe’s Dred resonate perhaps
somewhat uncomfortably with our contemporary moment, where Americans grapple
daily with the global politics of terror and the disastrous consequences that ensue
when these politics are brought to their logical conclusion. O f course, not all forms
o f terror are the same.23 Terror is neither a prepolitical nor a transcendental category,
but is instead deeply historical. Dred and the Appeal were produced at a particular
moment under very specific cultural and ideological constraints and were designed
to achieve a certain set of ends. Our ability to chart how terror exerts an influence
in a given text like the Appeal or Dred, as well as in a particular context like nineteenthcentury abolition, may allow us to think more deeply about how and why the contem
porary moment is so thoroughly marked by various rhetorics o f terror. Reading
abolitionist sentimentality precisely for the powerful way it mobilizes figurations of
apocalypse to inspire terror in its audience could allow us to uncover the often
insidious motivations behind and anticipate the possible consequences of contem
porary deployments of terror when they occur. This cultural work begins, at least
in part, when we recognize that incitements to terror are always tactical; they have
histories and make sense only in context. And few settings provide a better blue
print for reading contemporary deployments of terror than die sentimental imaginary
of nineteenth-century abolition.
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